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CERCLA THE WAGONS, OUR ATrORNEYJUST SWITCHED
SIDES AND NOW FIGHTS FOR APACHE:
GTE NORTH, INC. v. APACHE PRODUCTS
COMPANY
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal system operates under an established system of rules.
Certain ethical obligations govern attorneys' conduct as they deal
with clients and adverse parties.1 The obligations governing attor-
neys' conduct can be statutory or regulatory, procedural or eviden-
tiary, and also can be found in rules that govern professional
conduct 2 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are intended
to help attorneys avoid ethical conflicts.3 In the event that an attor-
ney violates an ethical obligation, a client may seek aid from the
courts.
4
Law firms or attorneys specializing in environmental practice
need to be especially cautious to avoid the appearance of impropri-
ety.5 One type of representation involving the need for heightened
1. STEPHEN Gni.ns & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LA.wvas, STATUTEs
AND STANDARDS 7 (1996). An attorney acting as an advocate must "zealously [as-
sert] the client's position under the rules of the adversary system." Id. at 6-7. In
the role of negotiator, however, an attorney's responsibilities are different. As a
negotiator, the attorney "seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent
with requirements of honest dealing with others." Id at 7. In addition, an attor-
ney "should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it,
including judges, other lawyers and public officials." Id
2. See id. at xi; see also Roy D. SIMON, JR. & MuRRAY L. SCHWARTz, LAWYERS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, CASES AND MATERALS (3d ed. 1994) (discussing issues
about lawyers and clients in terms of secrecy, adversary system, conflicts of
interest).
3. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCt (1996). The American Bar
Association approves these rules which various jurisdictions can adopt. GIL.Rs &
SIMON, supra note 1, at 9. The Rules of Professional Conduct "are designed to
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies." Id. at 10.
4. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 253 (7th Cir. 1983)
(affirming district court's order disqualifying law firm because attorney previously
worked for adverse party); GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp.
1575, 1581 (N.D. IM. 1996) (disqualifying attorney and law firm from representing
client whose interests were adverse to former client). But see GILLERs & SIMON,
supra note 1, at 11 (stating violation of ethical rules neither gives rise to cause of
action nor creates assumption that legal duty has been breached).
5. See Patrick E. Donovan, Comment, Seving Multipk Masters: Confronting the
Conflicting Interests that Arise in Superfund Disputes, 17 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REv. 371,
372 (1990). Firms specializing in environmental law are "more likely to undertake
multiple representations, due to the size of a typical environmental proceeding
(599)
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caution includes the representation of multiple defendants in an
action brought by the federal government pursuant to the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund).6 Another scenario which re-
quires caution involves the sharing of information among "Poten-
tially Responsible Parties" (PRPs).7 This is so because parties who
initially have an interest in sharing information may later have di-
vergent interests as liability is assessed and apportioned. 8
In GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Products Co.,9 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed the limita-
tions that the Rules of Professional Conduct for the Northern
District of Illinois impose on an attorney in a Superfund action. 10
Specifically, the district court determined that an attorney who rep-
and the relatively small number of firms capable of handling th [ese] type [s] of
[suits]." Id.; see e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 218
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (noting complexity of lawsuit involving over 250 defendants in
Superfund action).
6. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) (identifying parties that can
be held liable under CERCLA). CERCLA aids in the protection of the environ-
ment and in the clean-up of hazardous waste sites by imposing "strict and joint and
several liability on owners, operators, generators and transporters of hazardous
substances." William J. Holmes, The Evolution of the Trust: A Creative Solution to the
Trustee Liability Under CERCA, 6 Vn.L. ENVrt. L.J. 1, 2 (1995). Passed in 1980,
CERCLA allows EPA to initiate a clean-up of contaminated waste sites and further
authorizes EPA to recover the cost of the clean-up from those parties responsible
for creating the environmental hazards. See id. at 5. Further, CERCLA liability is
strict and "is imposed on responsible parties without regard to fault or negli-
gence." Id. at 6. Consequently, those parties who have been held liable for the
entire cost of clean-up have the right to sue other responsible parties for contribu-
tion. See id. It is likely that attorneys representing PRPs in the same action will
"encounter conflicting or adverse interests among clients." Donovan, supra note 5,
at 372.
7. See Donovan, supra note 5, at 386. Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs)
may avoid the imposition of joint and several liability by demonstrating that "the
greater share of liability belongs to other parties" and thus, the PRP may "reduce
its share of clean-up costs and shift those costs to its co-defendants." Id Conse-
quently, those defendants who try to show that damages should be apportioned
"create a conflict of interest [among those] parties retaining joint counsel." Id. at
387.
8. See id. at 387. The policies of EPA regarding settlement of Superfund ac-
tions "increase[ ] the likelihood that parties will become polarized during
Superfund negotiations." Id. Although an attorney may initially represent multi-
ple PRPs, "[g]iven the obvious benefits of avoiding duplication of effort and hav-
ing a unity of purpose in negotiating the most efficient cleanup plan with the
government . . .", concerns regarding conflicts of interest may arise. THE TASK
FORCE ON CONFLICrS OF INTERrMr, Conflict of Interest Issue, 50 Bus. LAw. 1381, 1422
(1995).
9. 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1578-79 (N.D. ll. 1996).
10. See id. at 1577-81.
[Vol. VIII: p. 599
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resented one client during the investigative stage of a Superfund
case was prohibited from representing another party in an ensuing
contribution suit, even though the former client was not a party in
the contribution action and consented to the attorney's subsequent
representation." The district court applied the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct for the Northern District of Illinois in order to dis-
qualify the attorney and his law firm.12
This Note will discuss the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their effect on environmental lawyers who represent PRPs in
Superfund actions. Part II presents the facts of GTE North.1 Then,
part III examines the Rules of Professional Conduct and the legal
context in which these rules have been applied.1 4 Subsequently,
part IV discusses the holding and reasoning of the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois in GTE North.15 Next, Part V criti-
cally analyzes the decision of the district court in light of prece-
dent1. 6 Finally, Part VI concludes with a discussion of the impact of
the district court's opinion on attorneys and their clients in
Superfund actions. 17
II. FACTS
On January 19, 1989, the federal government filed suit in the
Northern District of Illinois against seven defendants, seeking to
recover costs incurred in the clean-up of the Belvidere Municipal
11. See id. at 1581. The district court also determined that because the attor-
ney, Jon S. Faletto, could not represent the party in the contribution suit, the law
firm at which he was employed could not represent the party either. See id.
12. See id. at 1579-81. Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for the
Northern District of Illinois, entitled "Conflict of Interest: Former Client," states in
pertinent part as follows: "[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter ... unless the former client consents after disclosure." ILLINOIS
RuZEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNnuCr, 1.9(a) (West 1996).
Rule 1.10(a), entitled "Imputed Disqualification; General Rule" states as fol-
lows: "[n]o lawyer ... shall represent a client when the lawyer knows . . . that
another lawyer associated with that firm would be prohibited from doing so....
ILLINOIS RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr, 1.10(a) (West 1993).
13. For a discussion of the facts of GTE North, see infra notes 18-38 and accom-
panying text.
14. For a discussion of the relevant case precedent involving the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, see infra notes 39-82 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the holding and reasoning of the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in GTE North, see infra notes 83-108 and accompanying
text.
16. For an analysii of the court's opinion in GTE North, see infa notes 109-37
and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the impact of the decision of the court in GTE North,
see infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
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Landfill.' 8 Pursuant to CERCLA section 107, the defendants were
given notice of their PRP status.19 Five of these companies joined
together and formed the Appleton Road Committee.20 The mem-
bers of the committee then executed a cost sharing agreement (Ap-
pleton Agreement).21 In order to protect the parties, the Appleton
Agreement contained a provision entitled "Covenant Not to Sue."22
In addition, the agreement provided for the means by which the
18. See GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. at 1575, 1577 (N.D. Ill.
1996); United States v. GTE North, Inc., No. 90-C-20302 at *1 (N.D. 111. 1990). The
Belvidere Municipal Landfill is located in Boone County, Illinois and occupies 19.3
acres of a 139 acre site. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FEDERAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL SUPERFUND, RECORDS OF DECISIONS 1 (1988). The landfill is adjacent to the
Kishwaukee River and was owned by the City of Belvidere from 1939 to 1973. See
id. at 2. Originally, the landfill was used for domestic garbage. See id. In 1965,
Belvidere obtained a modified permit which allowed for the disposal of up to fifty-
two tons of domestic garbage, landscape wastes and demolition material per day.
See id.
Six years after the permit was granted, the operator of the landfill disclosed
that 100 tons of garbage were being deposited at the site daily. See id. Of the 100
tons, 35 tons came from residential sources, 30 tons came from industrial sources,
and 35 tons came from commercial sources. See id. The Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency dosed the landfill in 1973 after determining that hazardous
wastes had been deposited at the site over a period of several years. See id. In
1982, EPA placed the Belvidere Landfill on the National Priorities List of Hazard-
ous Waste Sites. See id. at 4-5. The cost to clean up the site totaled $5,900,000 and
requires an additional annual cost of $271,000 to continue monitoring and main-
mining the site. See id. at 2.
19. See Memorandum of Law in Support of GTE North, Inc.'s Motion to Dis-
qualify at 1-2, GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (No. 95-C-50197). CERCLA section 107 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility [or] ... (3) any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances....
shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe ....
CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994).
20. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1577.
21. See id. The members of the Committee "executed a joint remedial cost
sharing agreement" which was called the "Appleton Agreement." Id. The agree-
ment's purpose was to ensure compliance with the consent decree; allocate re-
sponse costs among members; identify additional PRPs; and provide a means to
pursue cost recovery against additional PRPs. See Memorandum of Law in Support
of GTE North, Inc.'s Motion to Disqualify, Exhibit A at 4, GTE North (No. 95-C-
50197).
22. See id. at Exhibit A at 25. The "Covenant Not to Sue" stated that each
member "agree[s] and covenant[s] . .. not to sue or take civil action against any
Member... or to seek recovery of monies ... for the performance of the actions
required by the Consent Decree, or against any Additional PRP who has settled
[with the committee]." Id.
4
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Appleton Road Committee's members could pursue "Cost Recovery
Action[s]" against other PRPs.23 In order to prevent members of
the Appleton Road Committee from revealing confidential infor-
mation, the Appleton Agreement also contained confidentiality
provisions which were intended to prevent disclosure by not only
the members to the agreement but also by their respective attor-
neys. 24 The Appleton Agreement had the effect of resolving "all
23. See id, at 2. The Cost Recovery Action provisions governed the manner in
which the members of the Appleton Road Committee could cooperatively pursue
contribution claims against other PRPs. The provision stated in part as follows:
[t]he cost recovery action will be prosecuted in the name of each Mem-
ber who chooses to join in the action. Each such Member may serve on
the Cost Recovery Committee. The Cost Recovery Committee will direct
the course of the litigation and will determine whether to accept settle-
ment from Additional PRPs and whether to distribute funds arising from
the action. The Cost Recovery Committee will act by majority vote....
Id. at 3.
24. See Memorandum of Law in Support of GTE North, Inc.'s Motion to Dis-
qualify, Exhibit A at 21-23, GTE North, (No. 95-C,50197). The "Confidentiality and
Use of Information" section was intended to govern the use of shared information,
the need to preserve attorney-client privilege and the confidentiality of shared in-
formation. See id. at Exhibit A at 21.
The "Shared Information" section provided that "the Members may elect to
disclose or transmit to each other such information as each Member deems appro-
riate for the sole and limited purpose of this Agreement." Id. This paragraph
rter provided that "[n] o claim of work product privilege or other privilege shall
be waived by reason of participation... in th[e] Agreement." I&
The Appleton Agreement also contained provisions governing the "Confiden-
tiality of Shared Information." Id, This section provided that:
[e]ach Member agrees that all shared information received from any
other Member or its counsel pursuant to this Agreement shall be held in
strict confidence by the receiving Member and by all persons to whom
such confidential information is revealed by the receiving Member, and
that such information shall be used only in connection with asserting any
common claims or defenses and conducting such other activities that are
necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of this Agreement .... "Id.
The agreement further provided that:
[s]hared information that is exchanged in written or in document form
and is intended to be kept confidential may, but need not, be marked
"Confidential" or with a similar legend. If such information becomes the
subject of an administrative or judicial order requiring disclosure of such
information by a Member or the Committee, the Member of the Commit-
tee may satisfy its confidentiality obligation hereunder by notifying the
Member of the Committee that generated the information and by giving
such Member or the Committee an opportunity to protect the confidenti-
ality of the information.
Id at Exhibit A at 22.
As a result of the confidentiality requirements, Members incurred a responsi-
bility to:
take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that any person
who is granted access to any shared information, who participates in work
or common projects, or who otherwise assists any counsel in connection
with the performance of this Agreement, is familiar with the terms of this
5
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liability and allocation issues [between] the members of the Apple-
ton [Road] Committee." 25
In 1989, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
issued an order that approved a final consent decree between the
federal government and the members of the Appleton Road Com-
mittee. 26 In October 1990, the United States filed an action against
GTE North, Inc. (GTE North) to recover costs incurred in the
clean-up of the Belvidere Municipal Landfill which had not been
recovered from the Appleton group.2 7 The federal government and
GTE North later settled this lawsuit in January 1993.28
Additionally, in 1993, the members of the Appleton Road
Committee entered into a second agreement (Investigation Agree-
ment) to share the cost of investigating other PRPs who had not
participated in reimbursing the federal government for expenses
incurred in the clean-up of the Belvidere Municipal Landfill.2 9 The
agreement and complies with such terms as they relate to the duties of
such person ....
Id.
The intent of the confidentiality provisions was "to protect from disclosure all
information and documents shared among any Members to the greatest extent
permitted by law, regardless of whether the sharing occurred before execution of
this Agreement and regardless of whether the writing or document is marked
'Confidential.'" Id. Further, the Member's obligations to keep information confi-
dential were to "remain in full force and effect, without regard to whether their
other obligations hereunder are terminated in any way." Id. at Exhibit A at 23.
Members were not, however, required to share information if a member believed
that sharing information would reveal "trade secrets, patents, copyrights or infor-
mation or materials protected by intellectual property rights." Id.
25. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1577.
26. See United States v. GTE North, Inc., No. 90-C-20302 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
A final consent decree is an order entered by the court whereby the defendants
agree to pay for the damages at the clean-up cite. See supra, at *2 n.21. Pursuant to
the consent decree, the Members of the Appleton Road Committee agreed to pay
a portion of the costs that the government incurred in the clean-up of the
Belvidere Municipal Landfill Site. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. The terms of the settlement agreement provided that GTE North
would reimburse the government $575,000 for costs incurred in the Belvidere
Landfill dean-up. See id. Prior to a settlement agreement, GTE North entered
into an agreement with the members of the Appleton Road Agreement who had
previously settled with the government, whereby GTE North agreed to participate
in the clean-up under the original consent decree in exchange for a promise by
the Investigation Committee not to pursue a cost recovery action against GTE
North. See id. GTE North was also permitted to join the "Investigation Agree-
ment." Id. For a full discussion of the Investigation Agreement, see infra note 29
and accompanying text.
29. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578. The Investigation Agreement "imple-
mented a joint investigation of additional PRPs who had not participated in the
clean up of the landfill." I& In addition, the "Investigation Agreement" estab-
lished the "Cost Recovery Committee." See id. Finally, the agreement contained
confidentiality provisions similar in form and content to the provisions in the Ap-
6
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parties who signed the Investigation Agreement, also referred to as
the Cost Recovery Committee, retained the law firm of Hinshaw &
Culbertson who had also served as GTE North's counsel.3 0 Chrysler
Corporation (Chrysler) was a member of both the Appleton Road
Committee and the Cost Recovery Committee and was represented
byJon S. Faletto of the law firm of Howard & Howard.31 As counsel
for Chrysler, Mr. Faletto was present during strategy discussions
pertaining to cost recovery against certain defendants, including
Dean Foods.3 2
At the conclusion of the investigation, Chrysler notified each
member of the Cost Recovery Committee that it would not pursue
any contribution actions against any other PRPs.3 3 In addition,
Chrysler assigned their rights of indemnity and contribution to the
remaining members of the Cost Recovery Committee.34 Each of
the remaining members of the Cost Recovery Committee also as-
signed their rights to sue in contribution to GTE North, who filed
suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against
Apache Products Company, Belvidere Daily Republican Company,
Dean Foods Company, Manley Motor Sales Company and The Pills-
bury Company.35
pleton Road Agreement. See id.; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of GTE
North, Inc.'s Motion to Disqualify at 3-4, GTE North, (No. 95-C-50197).
30. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578. Under the agreement, Hinshaw &
Culbertson disseminated "confidential communications" to each member of the
Cost Recovery Committee. See id.; see also David Littell, Consent and Disclosure in
Superfund Negotiations: Idenifying and Avoiding Conflicts of Interest Arsing from Multi-
pie Client Representation, 17 HARv. ENvrt. L. REv. 225, 247-49 (1993) (discussing
potential problems and distinct advantages associated with law firm attempting
dual representation in Superfund cases).
31. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1577-78.
32. See id. at 1578. The members of the Cost Recovery Committee were no
longer adverse, because the Appleton Agreement resolved all liability among the
members of the Appleton Road Committee. See Memorandum of Law in Support
of GTE North Inc.'s Motion to Disqualify at 5, GTE North, (No. 95-C-50197). The
Appleton Agreement also protected the exchange of information among the mem-
bers. See id. As a result, discussions between the members' attorneys were "open,
candid and a free sharing of strategy, confidences and attorney work product." Id.
33. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp at 1578. Chrysler notified the members of the
Appleton Road Committee of its decision not to sue in a letter dated March 13,
1995. Memorandum of Law in Support of Dean Foods Company's Response in
Opposition to the Motion to Disqualify at Exhibit B, GTE North (No. 95-C-50197).
34. See id. The March 13, 1995 letter also served to assign Chrysler's rights to
recover in contribution to the remaining members of the Cost Recovery Commit-
tee. See id. at Exhibit B at 1-2. The letter stated "this notice constitutes an assign-
ment of Chrysler's rights of indemnity and contribution to each of the other
members of the Appleton Road Committee who have elected to pursue or prose-
cute a CERCLA cost recovery and/or contribution action." Id.
35. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578.
1997] 605
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In the contribution suit GTE North brought, Jon S. Faletto of
Howard & Howard represented Dean Foods.s6 Subsequently, on
August 30, 1995, GTE North filed a motion to disqualify Jon S.
Faletto and the law firm of Howard & Howard in the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois.37 In granting GTE North's mo-
tion, the court disqualified both Mr. Faletto and his firm.s
III. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Provisions of CERCLA
CERCLA imposes strict liability for the clean-up of hazardous
sites on four categories of PRPs.5 9 In the event that enough evi-
36. See id. Before representing Dean Foods in the contribution suit, Howard
& Howard obtained Chrysler's consent to represent Dean Foods. Memorandum of
Law in Support of Dean Foods Company's Response in Opposition to the Motion
to Disqualify at 3-4, GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575 (N.D.
111. 1996) (No. 95-C-50197).
37. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578. The motion stated that "Jon S.
Faletto, on behalf of Chrysler Corporation, participated, along with GTE, in a
joint, pre-suit investigation of defendants, including Dean, and received privileged
and confidential information regarding GTE's case against Dean." GTE North's
Motion to Disqualify Jon S. Faletto and the Law Firm of Howard & Howard at 1,
GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575 (N.D. M. 1996) (No. 95-
C-50197). The motion also asserted that because "confidential information was
shared [between Mr. Faletto and GTE North], an implied attorney-client relation-
ship exists between Mr. Faletto and GTE [North]." Id. Finally, GTE North as-
serted that "Mr. Faletto's representation of Dean ... is adverse to and prejudicial
to GTE (North] ... [thereby] requiring disqualification" of both Mr. Faletto and
the law firm of Howard & Howard. Id. at 1-2.
38. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581.
39. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). CERCIA imposes lia-
bility for the cost of a Superfund cean-up on:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs of a hazardous sub-
stance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe ....
Id.
CERCLA defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Govern-
[Vol. VIII: p. 599
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dence exists for EPA to determine potential liability for the clean-
up, EPA notifies PRPs that they may be potentially liable.4° The
purpose behind EPA's notification process is to facilitate
settlement. 41
The EPA may initially contact only a few PRPs.42 Those PRPs
who are contacted may have to bear the brunt of the response costs
associated with the clean-up of the hazardous site.43 Those PRPs
who decide to settle with the federal government may then rectify
the inequitable results by bringing a contribution suit against addi-
tional parties who should be held responsible for the costs associ-
ated with the clean-up.44 Thus, CERCLA attempts to provide for
the clean-up of hazardous sites while using the common law rules of
joint and several liability to apportion liability.45
ment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any inter-
state body." Id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
40. See EPA Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations and Informa-
tion Exchange, 53 Fed. Reg. 5,298, 5,300-01 (1988). The notification process be-
gins when EPA sends a letter to each PRP. See id. Among the information
contained in the letter is information concerning clean-up costs and the addresses
of other PRPs. See id. at 5,302.
41. See id. at 5,298. EPA may choose to send a special notice letter which may
lead to a settlement offer between the PRPs and the federal government. See id. at
5,299. If EPA receives a settlement offer that it believes was made in good faith,
EPA will suspend commencement of proceedings for an additional 60 days. See id.
After EPA sends out the special notice letter, PRPs have to retain counsel, contact
other PRPs, and perhaps join together to investigate liability. See id. It is during
the investigative phase that PRPs may retain joint counsel and develop common
defenses. See Donovan, supra note 5, at 383.
42. See Donovan, supra note 5, at 385-86. As part of its strategy to encourage
settlements, EPA often targets and notifies only a portion of the PRPs. See id.
43. See id. at 385. The courts have:
consistently applied joint and several liability to CERCLA cases despite...
Congress' exclusion of [such a] provision in the statute. Courts reasoned
that Congress intended flexible common law principles of liability alloca-
tion to apply in Superfund proceedings. Additional support for the im-
position of joint and several liability in Superfund cases stems from the
fact that hazardous waste problems have a national significance and im-
plicate federal interests, thereby calling for the application of federal
common law. Therefore, the federal common law of joint and several
liability applies, and the burden of proving that damages are divisible and
capable of apportionment falls upon the defendant.
Id.
44. See CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). CERCLA permits suits in con-
tribution. See id. There are two situations where a party may bring a contribution
suit to recover its costs. See Donovan, supra note 5, at 385. "The first situation
occurs when a party voluntarily cleans up a site prior to governmental action and
seeks recovery under CERCIA section 107(a) (4) (B)." Id. at 385-86. The second
situation "occurs when a party is targeted as a PRP and attempts to limit it potential
liability by impleading ... other parties under CERCLA section 113(f)." Id.
45. For a discussion of the methods used to apportion liability, see supra notes
42-45 and accompanying text. See also City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
9
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B. Relevant Rules of Professional Conduct
The Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to guide attor-
neys as they engage in the practice of law.4 The courts may be
called upon to interpret these rules to help attorneys avoid conflicts
of interest and to assure fairness to each party.47 Specifically, Rule
1.9 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attor-
ney from representing a client whose interests are materially ad-
verse to the interests of a former client. 48 Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 "gives effect to the principles of loy-
alty" by causing the disqualification of an entire firm if an attorney
in that firm would be prohibited from representing a client in a
specific action.49
Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (allowing Philadelphia to sue for damages and recover
costs associated with clean-up from parties responsible for generating hazardous
waste).
46. For a discussion regarding the purposes of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, see supra notes 1-3, and infra notes 47-49, 52, 78-82 and accompanying text.
47. See e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1986) (af-
firming disqualification of defendant's attorney in criminal case based on attor-
ney's previous representation of prosecution's witness); Whiting Corp. v. White
Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming order that directed
plaintiff's counsel to refrain from representation that related to subject matter of
litigation); Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 227-28
(N.D. MI1. 1975), rev'd inpart, 532 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1986) (disquaing plaintiff's
attorney who had 12 year professional relationship with defendant).
48. See ILLINOIS RuLE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE NORTHERN Dmrucr
OF ILIlNOIS, Rule 1.9 cmt. (1996). Rule 1.9(a), entitled "Conflict of Interest: For-
mer Client" provides that "[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or substantially
related matter in which the person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the client consents after disclosure." Id.
Rule 1.9(c) further provides as follows:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter.., shall not
thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require
... or when the information has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6
or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.
Id.
Rule 1.6 permits an attorney to reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client to prevent the client from committing an act which would result in
"imminent death or substantial bodily harm" or to help the attorney "establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim" brought by the client. MODEL RuLES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996). Another rule that allows an attorney to
disclose information is Rule 3.3 which permits an attorney to reveal information to
prevent the commission of fraud to the tribunal. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1996).
49. See ILLINoIs RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.10 cmt. (1996).
Rule 1.10, entitled "Imputed Disqualification: General Rule" provides that "[n]o
lawyer associated with a firm shall represent a client when the lawyer knows or
10
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C. Judicial Disqualification of an Attorney
In the event a party raises an ethical question in the federal
courts, the district courts may exercise "discretionary authority to
disqualify counsel."50 A motion to disqualify is based upon a single
principle: "lawyer[s] must maintain the confidentiality of informa-
tion relating to the representation of a client."51 In hearing a mo-
reasonably should know that another lawyer associated with that firm would be
permitted from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c) or 1.9 ... ." Rule 1.10(a).
Rule 1.7 prohibits an attorney from representing a client whose interests are
materially adverse to the interests of another current client, unless the attorney
believes the representation will not affect the attorney's relationship with the first
client and the first client consents after consultation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CoNnuer, Rule 1.7 (1996). Rule 1.8(c) prohibits an attorney from prepar-
ing an instrument that gives a gift to the attorney or any of his relatives. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, Rule 1.8(c) (1996). For a full discussion of the
prohibition of representations imposed by Rule 1.9, see supra note 48 and accom-
panying text.
50. See e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722
(7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing district courts may disqualify an attorney but warning
discretion should be exercised with extreme caution); Nelson v. Green Builders,
Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1439, 1443-44 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (recognizing authority of district
court to disqualify attorney to protect attorney-client privilege).
In Freeman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
viewed the decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See
Freeman, 689 F.2d at 716. Freeman, represented by the firm of Dressler, Gold-
smith, Shore, Sutker & Milnamow, Ltd., brought suit against Chicago Musical In-
strument Co. (CMI) for patent infringement. See id. CMI was represented by
Fitch, Even, Tabin, Flannery & Welsh, who employed a former associate with the
firm representing Freeman. See id. at 717. CMI's firm filed a motion in the district
court requesting that the Fitch firm be permitted to continue in the litigation. See
id. The district court disqualified the firm representing CMI, stating that contin-
ued representation "would result in [the] appearance of impropriety." Id. In re-
viewing the disqualification, the Seventh Circuit recognized that disqualification
during litigation: separates a client from their chosen counsel and has the poten-
tial to damage the reputation of the disqualified firm, as such, disqualification is
immediately reviewable. See id. at 719.
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit remanded the issue of disqualification to
the district court. See id. at 724. Further, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[i]f the
subject matter of the former representation is not substantially related to [that of]
the present representation... [there is no ethical violation]." Id. at 722. More-
over, the Seventh Circuit stated that the district court needed to show that the
associate in the firm which represented CMI must have had actual knowledge in
order to warrant disqualification. See id. at 723; see alsoJulius Denenberg &Jeffrey
R. Learned, Multiple Party Representation, Conflicts of Interest, and Disqualification:
Problems and Solutions, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 497 (1992) (stating motions to disqualify
are discretionary and recognizing that decisions to disqualify not likely to be
overturned).
51. Nelson, 823 F. Supp. at 1444. In Nelson, three partners filed suit against
several businesses, one of which was Green Builders, Inc., a former partner in a
business venture with the three plaintiffs. See id. at 1441. The defendants were
represented by a firm which employed an attorney who had previously performed
some legal work for plaintiff Misco in respect to the partnership. See id. at 1442.
Plaintiff Misco then moved to have the defendant's firm disqualified. See id. Con-
sequently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
11
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tion to disqualify, the court must apply the Rules of Professional
Conduct applicable to the specific jurisdiction.52 In Westinghouse
Electric v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,53 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit determined that disqualification is appropriate
when ethical obligations of preserving confidential communica-
tions are at issue.M In Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.,55 the Sev-
enth Circuit further stated that an implied attorney-client
relationship may be found if the moving party can demonstrate that
entered an order disqualifying defendant's attorney. See id. at 1452. In entering
the order to disqualify, the Nelson court recognized that disqualification may pro-
tect one attorney-client relationship, while necessarily destroying another. See id.
at 1444.
52. Healy v. Axlerod Constr. Co., 155 F.R.D. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (granting
defendants' motion to disqualify former attorney who subsequently represented
adverse party because confidences were revealed even though attorney acted for
limited purpose). The Healy court stated:
[o]ne of the inherent powers of any federal court is the admission and
supervision of attorneys practicing before it. The courts have a vital inter-
est in protecting the integrity of their judgments, maintaining public con-
fidence in the integrity of the bar, eliminating conflicts of interest, and
protecting confidential communications between attorneys and their cli-
ents. To protect these vital interests, a district court has the inherent
power to disqualify an attorney from representing a particular client. Dis-
qualification is a drastic measure, however, because it deprives one of the
litigants of their choice of counsel.
Id. at 619; see also Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1384 (10th Cir. 1994)
(stating attorneys appearing before courts are bound by local rules including Rules
of Professional Conduct); English Feedlot Inc. v. Norden Lab., Inc., 833 F. Supp.
1498, 1506 (D. Colo. 1993) (applying Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct to
disqualify attorney who previously represented one party then represented oppo-
nent in later proceedings).
53. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
54. See id. at 1318. In Westinghouse, the Seventh Circuit addressed two issues:
first, whether an attorney-client relationship is created by the submission of confi-
dential information by a person to an attorney whom that person believes repre-
sents them, and second, whether the size of a law firm can serve to isolate a firm
from ethical considerations. See id. at 1312. Westinghouse, represented by Kirk-
land & Ellis, filed suit against 29 defendants in an antitrust action. See id. at 1313.
Kirkland simultaneously represented the defendants for the purpose of analyzing
the antitrust aspects of a congressional proposal and the effects that legislation
would have on the defendants. See id.
The Seventh Circuit recognized the existence of an implied attorney-client
relationship in the situation when a person consults with an attorney in a prelimi-
nary matter, even though no formal representation occurs. See id. at 1318. The
existence of an implied attorney-client relationship "hinges upon the client's belief
that [the client] is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and has manifested an inten-
tion to seek professional legal advice." Id. at 1319. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that Westinghouse's interests were diminished because they switched representa-
tion in the antitrust action. See id. at 1321-22. Nevertheless, Westinghouse was
given the option to discharge Kirkland as its attorney or dismiss several of the
defendants. See id.
55. 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
12
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confidential information was submitted to a lawyer with a reason-
able belief that the lawyer was acting as the party's attorney.56
Disqualification is warranted when an attorney represents "a
party in a matter in which the adverse party is that lawyer's former
client, if the subject matter of the two representations is 'substan-
tially related.'"5 7 In LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake,58 the
Seventh Circuit stated that the "substantial relationship test" may
also be satisfied if confidential information relevant to the second
representation could have been revealed in the first representa-
tion.59 If the court finds that a "substantial relationship" exists, it
can further presume that the attorney has received confidential in-
56. See id. at 1269. John Malec, a partner of NPD, retained the law firm of
Schwartz & Freeman to aid in the transfer of stock to himself, for which NPD paid
the legal expenses. See id. at 1265. Later, Malec sold his stock in NPD back to his
partners. See id. Soon thereafter, Malec's wife formed Analytica to compete with
NPD. See id. Analytica then retained Schwartz & Freeman to address their con-
cerns that NPD was engaging in anti-competitive behavior. See id. Analytica later
engaged another firm as trial counsel. I&. Analytica filed suit, and NPD moved to
have Analytica's counsel disqualified. See id. at 1266.
The district court disqualified both law firms and ordered that NPD be reim-
bursed for the cost of litigation, a decision which was later appealed. See id. The
Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal pertaining to disqualification and upheld the
imposition of attorneys fees, finding that Schwartz & Freeman had switched sides
in a matter related to their previous representation. See id. at 1270; see also DCA
Foods Indus., Inc. v. Tasty Foods, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Wisc. 1985) (denying
motion to disqualify because moving party had not met burden of proof showing
confidential information had been shared).
57. Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1266.
58. 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983).
59. See id. at 255. In LaSa!/e, a bank retained the services of Rudnick & Wolfe,
who employed a former attorney for the county. See id. at 253. Rudnick & Wolfe
filed suit on behalf of the bank against the county. See id. at 254. The county
moved to have the firm disqualified when it learned that Rudnick and Wolfe hired
their former attorney. See id. The Seventh Circuit applied a three-prong test to
determine if a substantial relationship existed. See id. at 255. The test required the
court to consider the following: 1) the scope of prior representation; 2) whether
confidential information could have been given to the attorney in the first repre-
sentation; and 3) the relevance of the information to the instant case. See id. at
255-56. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in determining that the subject matter was within the scope of the attorney's
representation, that it was reasonable to infer confidential information had been
given to the county's former attorney, and that the information was relevant to the
instant case. See id. at 256-57. Further, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by disqualifying the firm that represented
the bank, because the firm had not taken the necessary measures to isolate the
county's former attorney from the instant case. See id. at 259; see also Schiessle v.
Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming disqualification because firm for
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that steps were taken to isolate former defendant's
attorney from involvement in case); Denenberg & Learned, supra note 50, at 502
(discussing Seventh Circuit's three-prong test, as used in LaSa//e, to determine
existence of substantial relationship).
13
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formation.60 Moreover, as long as the court finds a substantial rela-
tionship between the two representations, actual receipt and usage
of information by an attorney against a former client need not
occur.6 1
Under certain circumstances, an attorney may be prohibited
from sharing information obtained from his client with another
party whose interests are the same as the attorney's actual client.62
Further, disqualification is a remedy that ensures confidentiality
60. See Cromley v. Board of Educ. of Lockport High Sch. Dist. 205, 17 F.3d
1059, 1065 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that attorney may overcome presumption
of receiving confidential information if he has created "Chinese wall" to isolate
attorney from information relevant to current case).
61. See Novo Terapeutisk Lab. A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 607 F.2d
186 (7th Cir. 1979). In Novo, a defendant in a patent infringement case retained
the services of an attorney who formerly worked for the firm which represented
the plaintiff. See id. at 194. The defendant previously retained the services of the
plaintiff's firm and filed a motion to disqualify the plaintiff's firm. See id. at 195.
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the mo-
tion to disqualify. See id. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court improp-
erly applied the substantial relationship test. See id. The court further found that
defendant's attorney, while working for the firm representing the plaintiff, failed
to show that he had access to confidential information regarding the patent work.
See id. at 197. This failure, the court reasoned, was a limited way by which the
presumption of shared confidences could be rebutted. See id.
62. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th
Cir. 1977). In Armco, the district court denied a motion to disqualify Stephen Sus-
man, an attorney who previously represented Whitlow Steel in an antitrust action
in Texas. See id. at 251. Susman was present during discussions of confidential
information between Whitlow Steel and the other defendants, including Armco
Steel, Ceco and Laclede. See id. Those meetings included the sharing of informa-
tion which was aimed at "develop[ing] a cooperative defense." Id.
At the same time, Susman represented a plaintiff in a similar antitrust action
against Armco, Ceco and Laclede. See id. The defendants in the later lawsuit filed
a motion to disqualify Susman based on his access to confidential information. See
id. at 252. The district court denied the motion to disqualify and the defendants
appealed. See id. at 251. The appellate court stated:
when information is exchanged between various co-defendants and their
attorneys that this exchange is not made for the purpose of allowing un-
limited publication and use, but rather, the exchange is made for the
limited purpose of assisting in their common cause. In such a situation,
an attorney who is the recipient of such information breaches his fiduci-
ary duty if he later, in his representation of another client, is able to use
this information to the detriment of one of the co-defendants.
Id. at 253.
The court concluded by stating the following:
Ujiust as an attorney would not be allowed to proceed against his former
client in a cause of action substantially related to the matters in which he
previously represented that client, an attorney should also not be allowed
to proceed against a co-defendant of a former client wherein the subject
matter of the present controversy is substantially related . .. ."
Id. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case, because the district court had not deter-
mined whether any confidential information had been given to Susman. See id.; see
also Rio Hondo Implement Co. v. Euresti, 903 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding disqualification of former co-counsel requires proof that confidential in-
14
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and encourages full disclosure. 63 Moreover, the courts use disquali-
fication to foster a sense of trust between clients and attorneys.6 4
In Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Manufacturing Co.,65 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit cautioned
against arbitrary usage of disqualification.66 However, the authority
to disqualify an attorney is discretionary.67 In response, the party
formation was shared and such information is substantially related to current
representation).
63. See Hughes v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 565 F. Supp. 663, 666(N.D. 111. 1983) (recognizing disqualification designed to encourage full disclosure
of all information necessary for trial preparation); see also Cannon v. United States
Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 216 (N.D. 111. 1975) (noting that multiple repre-
sentation permissible in some instances if both clients consent to representation
after being fully informed of potential conflict).
64. See Hughes, 565 F. Supp. at 666. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
contemplate the necessity of assuring trust between attorney and client. See United
States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1986). In O'Maley, the attorney for a
criminal defendant was disqualified after the prosecution revealed that their key
witness was a former client of the defense attorney. See id. at 789. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that disqualification in criminal cases is different than in
civil cases, primarily because criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel which would be affected by disqualification. See id..
The appellate court stated "[d]isqualification motions should be granted
where the attorney.., is potentially in a position to use privileged information
obtained during prior representation...." Id. at 790. In OMaLey, it was not the
attorney's former client who asserted the attorney-client privilege, but rather the
adverse party who sought disqualification. See id. at 791. Nevertheless, the court
still upheld the disqualification. See id.
65. 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
66. See id. In Panduit, the Federal Circuit reviewed an order of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that disqualified attorney
Robert Conte and his firm Laff, Whitesel, Conte & Saret, who represented thedefendant in a patent infringement case. See id. at 1567. In 1981, the firm repre-
senting the defendant, All States, merged with Conte, who was associated with the
plaintiffs law firm from 1965 to 1975. See id. at 1568. Conte's former firm repre-
sented the defendant in foreign patent work which was not considered to involve
the use of confidential information. See id. After Panduit objected, Conte's in-
volvement with the litigation ended. See id. at 1569.
The district court determined that Conte's association was substantially re-lated, but concluded that actual knowledge would be presumed unless All States
could show that Conte had no actual knowledge. See id. In an affidavit, Conte
stated that he did not remember ever receiving confidences. See id. at 1570. Fur-
thermore, the partners in his firm swore under oath that Conte never shared
Panduit's confidences. See id. Despite specific findings that Conte had no current
knowledge and that he did not share his knowledge with his new firm, the district
court disqualified Conte and his firm. See id. The court found that the possibility
that confidential information could be revealed warranted disqualification in this
case. See id. at 1571. The appellate court reversed the order disqualifying the law
firm of Laff, Whitesel, Conte & Saret. See id. at 1581; see also Whiting Corp. v.
White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming district court's deci-
sion denying motion to disqualify law firm because past representation for patent
work not substantially related to current litigation involving payment of taxes).
67. See e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722(7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing district courts may disqualify an attorney but warning
15
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moving for disqualification must first show that sufficient cause ex-
ists to justify disqualification. 68 The party opposing disqualification
generally argues that disqualification would be too drastic a mea-
sure under limited circumstances.69
The negative effects of disqualification are two-fold.70 First and
most obvious, disqualification separates the client from her counsel
of choice.71 Second, the disqualified attorney or law firm may suf-
fer harm.72 The harm the law firm suffers also occurs in two ways:
first, the firm loses a client, and second, disqualification may dimin-
ish the law firm's reputation.73
Similarly, in Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co.,74 the Sev-
enth Circuit stated that a motion to disqualify must be reviewed
with caution, for the motion can be used as a harassment tech-
nique.75 Despite the need for caution, the moving party has "sev-
eral presumptions working in [their] favor"76 once the movant has
discretion should be exercised with extreme caution); Nelson v. Green Builders,
Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1439, 1443-44 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (recognizing authority of district
court to disqualify attorney to protect attorney-client privilege).
68. See Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1983) (remanding to
district court with instructions to hold evidentiary hearing to determine whether
moving party met heavy burden of proof).
69. SeeFreeman, 689 F.2d at 719. By separating a client from her chosen coun-
sel, disqualification disrupts litigation. See id. Additionally, disqualification may
have an adverse effect on the reputation of the lawyer who is disqualified. See id.
Finally, the Freeman court concluded that disqualification is "a drastic measure
which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary." Id. at
721. For a discussion of the facts in Freeman, see supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
70. See Denenberg & Learned, supra note 50, at 512 (discussing effects of dis-
qualification on client and attorney).
71. See id. The client feels the immediate effects of disqualification, because
litigation may be disrupted "until new counsel can be obtained and brought up to
speed; this can be very troublesome in complicated cases and is often a very expen-
sive proposition." Id.
72. See id. at 513. Denenberg and Learned argue that "[cilients are not the
only group hurt by expansive use of the disqualification device." Id.
73. See id. Law firms state that additional harm comes to the law firm "for it
has lost a client (at least for one case), and, more importantly, its reputation has
been damaged." Id.
74. 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982).
75. Freeman, 689 F.2d at 722. In Freeman, the Seventh Circuit stated "[w]e do
not mean to infer that motions to disqualify counsel may not be legitimate, for
there obviously are situations where they are both legitimate and necessary;, none-
theless, such motions should be viewed with extreme caution for they can be mis-
used as techniques of harassment." Id. For a discussion of the facts in Freeran, see
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
76. Panduit Corp. v. AU States Plastic Mfg., Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984). The "substantial relationship" test favors the movant in that there is a pre-
sumption that the attorney has received confidential information based on the
past relationship. See id. This presumption will only be overcome if the non-mov-
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/8
1997] APACHE PRODUCTS 615
met the "burden of proving facts required for disqualification
"77
The purpose of many of the Rules of Professional Conduct is to
protect any confidences that a client might share with her attorney
during the course of representation. 78 One such rule provides that
an attorney shall not reveal any information regarding the repre-
sentation of a client, unless the client gives prior consent.79 An-
other rule prohibits an attorney from concurrently representing
clients who have adverse interests.80 The Rules of Professional Con-
duct further prohibit an attorney from representing a client if the
representation could jeopardize a former client's confidences. 81 In
the event that an attorney is disqualified in the representation of a
client, that disqualification may be imputed to the entire firm.82
IV. NAR TTnE ANALYsIs
In GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods., Inc.,8s the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the merits
ing party can demonstrate that she was not privy to confidential information. See
id.
77. See Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 794 (2d Cir. 1983). In Evans,
the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York and disqualified the law firm of Rabin &
Silverman from representing David Evans. Se id. at 789. Rabin & Silverman repre-
sented Evans in connection with a shareholders suit brought against Artek and its
parent company, Dynatech. See id. at 790. Rabin & Silverman previously investi-
gated alleged wrongful conduct by Dynatech at the request of Artek's president
but for the benefit of Artek's shareholders. See id. at 789. The Second Circuit
remanded the case for a determination of whether Rabin & Silverman was retained
by Artek or Dynatech. See id. at 792. The court stated that the substantial rela-
tionship test was met by the facts of the case. See id; see also Government of India v.
Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming disqualification of
attorney after showing that two representations were substantially related and at-
torney had access to confidential information).
78. See Denenberg & Learned, supra note 50, at 498. Courts must consider
the competing interests involved in a motion to disqualify. See id. Among those
considerations are "duty of loyalty to a client; preservation of client confidences;
prerogative of a party to retain counsel of its choice; maintenance of the integrity
of the profession; and avoidance of the hardship imposed on clients, attorneys and
the courts by disqualification of counsel." Id.
79. See MODEL RuLms OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996).
80. See MODEL RuLas OF PROFESSIONAL CoNucr Rule 1.7 (1996).
81. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.9 (1996).
82. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoN-nucr Rule 1.10 (1996); see also
Mustang Enter., Inc. v. Plug-In Storage Sys., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. 111. 1995)
(discussing imputed disqualification of firm due to disqualification of attorney
within that firm).
83. 914 F. Supp. 1575 (N.D. IIl. 1996).
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of a motion to disqualify an attorney in a cost-recovery action.84
The court determined that the circumstances of the case were suffi-
cient to warrant disqualification of both the attorney and the firm
representing Dean Foods.8 5 The court began its analysis of the mo-
tion to disqualify by discussing GTE North's contentions supporting
the motion.8 6 GTE North cited the confidentiality provisions of
both the Appleton and the Investigation Agreements to support its
motion to disqualify.8 7 In turn, Dean Foods opposed the disqualifi-
cation motion by stating that GTE North could not have had a "rea-
sonable belief that Faletto was acting as GTE [North] 's attorney."88
84. See id. at 1577. For a full discussion of the facts in GTE North, see supra
notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
GTE North filed suit against Apache Products Company, Belvidere Daily Re-
publican Company, Dean Foods Company, Manley Motor Sales Company and The
Pillsbury Company. See id. The cost recovery action was filed pursuant to the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). See id, For a discussion of pertinent CERCLA provisions, see supra
notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
GTE North filed a motion to disqualify the attorney that filed an appearance
on behalf of Dean Foods, a defendant in the cost recovery action. See id. at 1578.
The motion was based on Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 1.9 (1996). See id.
For a more thorough discussion of Rule 1.9, see supra notes 12 and 48 and accom-
panying text. GTE North's motion also included a request to disqualify the attor-
ney's firm, Howard & Howard. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578. The motion to
disqualify Howard and Howard was based on Illinois Rules of Professional Con-
duct, Rule 1.10 See id. at 1581. For a full discussion of Rule 1.10, see supra notes 12
and 49 and accompanying text.
85. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581. The district court stated "GTE
[North]'s motion to disqualifyJon S. Faletto and the firm of Howard & Howard as
counsel for Dean Foods is granted." Id,
86. See id. at 1578. GTE North contended that the attorney for Dean Foods
owed GTE North "a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidences disclosed during
the Ijoint] investigation . . . ." Id. GTE North further stated that the "implied
attorney-client relationship arose from the peculiar relationship between the mem-
bers of the Cost Recovery Committee .... " Id. Finally, GTE alternatively con-
tended that "fundamental fairness bars Faletto and Howard & Howard from
representing Dean Foods ... ." Id.
87. See id. at 1578. The district court stated that "GTE relies on the confiden-
tiality provisions in both the Appleton and Investigation Agreements and the fact
that confidential information and legal strategy was freely communicated between
all of the Cost Recovery Committee members and their attorneys." Id. For a dis-
cussion of the confidentiality provisions in the Appleton and Investigation Agree-
ments, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
88. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578. The attorney for Dean Foods con-
tended that if GTE was attempting to create an implied attorney-client relation-
ship, it must show "that [GTE] supplied information with the reasonable belief
that Faletto was acting as GTE's attorney." Id. Dean Foods further contended that
any such belief was "unreasonable in light of the fact that GTE [North had been]
represented by its [own] counsel [during the investigation period]." Id. More-
over, Dean Foods stated that in order to prevail on a fundamental fairness argu-
ment, GTE needed to demonstrate "a pre-existing attorney-client relationship with
Faletto. ... " Id.
18
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In GTE North, the district court followed the precedent that the
Seventh Circuit established in Freemain9 and the Northern District
of Illinois laid out in Healy.90 In its motion, GTE North applied the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.9 and 1.10, which are
identical to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct-91 Thus, the
district court determined that it would apply federal case law and
the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to GTE North's motion
to disqualify.92
The court then addressed the question of "whether some sort
of fiduciary relationship arose between [GTE North and the attor-
ney for Dean Foods] that would make GTE [North] a 'former cli-
ent' for purposes of disqualification . . . ."9 Relying upon the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Westinghouse,94 the district court identi-
fied several ways by which an implied attorney-client relationship
can be formed.95 Specifically, the court determined that the exam-
ple involving an exchange of information among defendants was
89. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir.
1982) (stating ethical questions in federal courts governed by federal case law).
For a discussion of Freeman, see supra notes 50 and 69 and accompanying text.
90. Healy v. Axlerod Constr. Co., 155 F.R.D. 615, 620 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (apply-
ing Rules of Professional Conduct for Northern District of Illinois). The district
court recognized that this application is consistent with the decisions of other juris-
dictions. See id.; cf. Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994)
(applying Rules of Professional Conduct for District Court for District of New Mex-
ico); English Feedlot v. Norden Lab., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1506 (D. Colo. 1993)
(applying Rules of Professional Conduct for District of Colorado).
91. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1579.
92. See id. at 1578. For the textual language of the pertinent Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct, see supra notes 4849 and accompanying text.
93. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578. The district court did not need to
address the "substantial relationship test," because Dean Foods did not argue that
the matters were not substantially related, nor did Dean Foods argue that the par-
ties were not adverse. See id. Similarly, GTE North did "not contend that an ex-
press-client relationship existed" but rather argued the existence of "an implied
attorney-client relationship." Id. If there was a dispute over the substantial rela-
tionship test, the court would have had to apply the Seventh Circuit's test as de-
fined and applied in LaSa/& See id. at 1579. The LaSal/e test requires a three step
inquiry- (1) reconstructing the scope of the prior representation; (2) ascertaining
whether information was given with the expectation of representation; and (3)
whether the given information could be relevant to the current representation. See
id. For a discussion of the facts in LaSa/e see supra note 59 and accompanying
text.
94. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.
1977). For a discussion of the facts and issues presented in Westinghouse, see supra
note 54 and accompanying text.
95. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1579. In Westinghouse, the Seventh Circuit
recognized five exceptions that could give rise to the existence of an implied attor-
ney-client relationship. See Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1319.
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relevant.96 Further, the court recognized that a "fiduciary relation-
ship may result because of the... circumstances under which confi-
dential information is divulged."97
Next, the district court determined there was an actual ex-
change of information. 98 The court stated that there could be no
presumption that confidential information was exchanged because
such a presumption only applies in an express attorney-client rela-
tionship.99 Because there could be no such presumption, the court
turned to the party's briefs to determine whether an exchange had
occurred between GTE North and Chrysler's counsel.100 The dis-
trict court determined that Dean Foods' attorney failed to dispute
the assertion that confidential information had been received.' 0 '
The failure to challenge such an assertion, the court reasoned, is
dispositive of the fact that confidential information has been
shared.'02 The court pointed to both the Appleton and Investiga-
tion Agreements as evidence of the members intent that shared in-
96. GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1579. The Seventh Circuit stated that an im-
plied attorney-client relationship occurs in the following situation:
[w]hen information is exchanged between co-defendants and their attor-
neys ... an attorney who is the recipient of such information breaches his
fiduciary duty if he later, in his representation of another client, is able to
use this information to the detriment of one of the co-defendants, even
though that co-defendant is not the one which he [initially] represented
Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1319.
97. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1580 (quoting Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at
1320).
98. See id. at 1580. The district court stated that in the event that there was
"no direct or express attorney-client relationship, [the substantial relationship test]
requires a showing that the attorney in question was privy to confidential informa-
tion." Id. at 1580 (citing Rio Hondo Implement Co. v. Euresti, 903 S.W.2d 128,
132 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)). For a discussion of the holding of Rio Hondo, see supra
note 62 and accompanying text.
99. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1580. The district court stated that "a pre-
sumption that confidential information was exchanged is in error, as the presump-
tion exists only where there is an express attorney-client relationship and the [two]
matters are substantially related." Id.
100. See i. at 1580. This determination was "based on the undisputed facts
contained in the parties' memorandums." Id. Further, the court stated that the
existence of confidentiality agreements, by themselves, does not prove that confi-
dential information was actually exchanged. See id.
101. See id. at 1581. The court stated that "pursuant to their agreement...
the investigation results [were disseminated] to each member's respective counsel,
including Faletto." Id. at 1580-81. The court continued, stating "it is undisputed
that counsel for each member, including Falettojoindy discussed the investigation
results, strategy, and legal merit of proceeding against additional PRPs, including
Dean Foods." Id. at 1581.
102. See id. at 1581. The district court stated: "[t]hese undisputed facts alone
support a finding that confidential information was exchanged between the co-
plaintiffs and their respective counsel." Id. at 1581.
20
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formation would remain confidential.103 As a result, the district
court held that Mr. Faletto's continued representation of Dean
Foods would be a violation of Rule 1.9, and as such, he should be
disqualified from representing Dean Foods.1 04
Finally, the district court addressed whether disqualification of
the law firm of Howard & Howard would be proper under Rule
1.10.105 Imputed disqualification was not applicable, for Mr.
Faletto "[a]t all times relevant... ha[d] been a member [of] How-
ard & Howard .... "10 6 Because Howard & Howard changed sides
in this Superfund action, the presumption that the firm obtained
shared confidences was declared irrebuttable.107 The court thus
concluded that Rule 1.10 should preclude the entire firm of How-
ard & Howard from representing Dean Foods in the contribution
case brought by GTE North.108
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois correctly
decided that the attorney for Dean Foods entered into an implied
attorney-client relationship with GTE North.1°9 In addition, the
court properly determined that GTE North disseminated informa-
tion with the belief that the information would not be used against
103. See id. For a discussion of the language of the Appleton and Investiga-
tion Agreements, see supra notes 21-25, 29 and accompanying text. GTE North
disclosed the information to Chrysler and its attorney "with the expectation that
[the information] would not be disclosed to the targets of the investigation." GT
North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581. Confidentiality also led GTE North to conclude that
any disclosure of information and participation in discussions would prohibit
Faletto from "reappearing on the opposite side of the same litigation." Id.
104. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581.
105. Id. For the textual language of the Illinois Rules of Professional Con-
duct, Rule 1.10(a) (1996), see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
106. GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581; see also Cromley v. Board of Educ. of
Lockport, 17 F.3d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing exception to imputed
disqualification when attorney switches sides but not when entire firm switches
sides).
107. Accord Crom/ey, 17 F.3d at 1065 n.3. See also Denenberg & Learned, supra
note 50, at 514 (recognizing existence of irrebuttable presumptions and discussing
circumstances when presumption is irrebuttable).
108. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581. The court summarized its decision
by stating "GTE's motion to disqualify Jon S. Faletto and the firm of Howard &
Howard as counsel for Dean Foods is granted." Id.
109. For a discussion of an implied attorney-client relationship, see supra
notes 93-96 and accompanying text. The GTE North court reached the conclusion
that an implied attorney-client relationship existed by following the analysis set
forth in Westinghouse. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581. In Westinghouse, the
Seventh Circuit recognized five situations in which an implied attorney-client rela-
tionship could be created. See Westinghowe Eec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 508 F.2d
1311, 1319 (7th. Cir. 1977).
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them at a later date.110 Finally, the court appropriately found the
existence of a fiduciary relationship.1
A. Implied Relationship
As Westinghouse decision recognized, an implied attorney-client
relationship can be created if "information is exchanged between
co-defendants and their attorneys." 112 Once an attorney receives
confidential information he has a fiduciary duty to the client who
shared the information. 11s The Fifth Circuit has also recognized
that a fiduciary duty may arise with the sharing of confidences be-
tween defendants." 4 In Abraham, the Fifth Circuit stated that joint
defenses cause the counsel of one defendant to be the counsel for
each of the defendants "in order to shield mutually shared confi-
dences.""15 Consequently, the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois properly found that an implied attorney-client
relationship existed between GTE North and Jon S. Faletto.
B. Actual Information and Reasonable Belief
Furthermore, the district court correctly found that GTE
North shared information with the belief that the information
would not be used against them at a later date. In Westinghouse, the
Seventh Circuit required that information which a party intends to
remain confidential must be communicated within the scope, and
110. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1580-81. GTE North disseminated confi-
dential information pursuant to the language of the agreement. See id. at 1581.
These agreements contained confidentiality statements upon which GTE could
reasonably rely. See id.
111. See id. In cases that involve a motion to disqualify an attorney, the court
normally conducts an evidentiary hearing or reviews the facts contained in sworn
affidavits to determine whether confidential information was exchanged. See id. at
1580. However, in this case, the court determined that the unchallenged state-
ments of facts in the parties' briefs were sufficient to conclude that confidential
information was disclosed. See id.
112. Westinghouse 580 F.2d at 1318.
113. See id. This fiduciary duty requires the recipient of the information to
protect the information in a manner that would protect the interests of the party
that made the disclosure. See id. Furthermore, the person to whom the informa-
tion was disclosed must also guard the information so that it is not used to the
detriment of the person who shared the information. See id.
114. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250
(5th Cir. 1977).
115. Id. at 253. The Armco court stated that "[t]he defendants persuasively
argue that in a joint defense ... the counsel of each defendant is, in effect, the
counsel of all for the purposes of invoking the attorney-client privilege ..... " Id.
The Fifth Circuit further stated that an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty if that
information is used at a later date to the detriment of one of the co-defendants.
See id.
22
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for the purpose, of representation.11 6 In other words, the client
must reasonably believe that any information communicated was
for the purpose of representation and that the information would
remain confidential.1 17 Therefore, the GTE North court properly
rejected the presumption that there was an exchange of confiden-
tial information." s Instead, the district court had to determine
whether confidential information had actually been exchanged. 119
Although this determination would normally have been done
in a hearing or a review of the evidence, it is within the discretion of
the court to determine whether confidences were disclosed
through a review of the parties' briefs.12 0 Furthermore, the Seventh
Circuit has stated that conducting a factual inquiry is not always
practical to determine if confidences were revealed.' 2' Conse-
quently, the district court properly determined that confidential in-
formation was actually disclosed. 22
C. Additional Precedent Supporting GTE North's Motion to
Disqualify
Despite reaching a correct result, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois by no means exhausted
the available precedent that would have supported GTE North's
116. See Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1320. The Seventh Circuit recognized that a
"professional relationship does not arise where one consults an attorney in a capac-
ity other than as an attorney." Id.
117. See id. at 1320-21. An implied relationship "hinges upon the client's [rea-
sonable] belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity. . . ." Id. at 1319
(quoting McCoRMcx ON EvmENCE 179 (2d ed. 1972)). The court stated that the
defendants "each entertained a reasonable belief that it was submitting confiden-
tial information ... upon a representation that the firm was acting in the undi-
vided interest of each company." Id. at 1321.
118. See also Wilson, 559 F.2d at 253. The Fifth Circuit stated that when there
is no direct attorney-client relationship, there can be no presumption that confi-
dential information was exchanged. See id. The determination as to whether infor-
mation was exchanged depends specifically on the findings of the trial court. See
id.
119. See GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (N.D.
IM. 1996).
120. See id.
121. See Westinghouse 580 F.2d at 1319. The court stated that "conducting a
factual inquiry in every case into whether confidences had actually been revealed
would not [always] be ... satisfactory." Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708
F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983). The difficulty in determining whether confi-
dences have been shared arises, because the only witnesses to any information dis-
closure that had been disclosed would be the attorneys. See id. For a discussion of
the facts of Analytica, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of the holding of the GTE North court, see supra notes
83-108 and accompanying text.
1997]
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motion to disqualify.123 One such case that supports disqualifica-
tion is Intenational Paper Co. v. Lloyd Manufacturing.124 The decision
in International Paper demonstrates that an attorney may rebut the
presumption that confidential information has been disclosed. 125
In GTE North, however, Mr. Faletto did not attempt to rebut the
presumption, and without a challenge to the presumption, disquali-
fication is not improper.1 26
Another case that supports disqualification is Trinity Ambulance
Services v. G & L Ambulance SerVices. 127 In Trinity, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut granted a motion to
disqualify after one of the original plaintiffs switched over to the
defendants' side.128 The court applied the "reasonable expectation
123. For a discussion of additional case precedent supporting disqualifica-
tion, see infra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
124. 555 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In International Paper, the district court
denied a disqualification motion. See id. at 127. International Paper brought suit
against Lloyd Manufacturing alleging that Lloyd's product was not safe for its in-
tended purpose. See id. In turn, Lloyd filed a third party complaint against Velsicol
Chemical Company and Harwick Chemical Company. See id. Lloyd claimed that it
relied on the warranties of the manufacturer (Velsicol) and the distributor (Har-
wick) when establishing the warranties for its product. See id Consequently, Lloyd
claimed that Velsicol and Harwick should be liable for any damages assessed
against Lloyd. See id.
Subsequently, Harwick brought a cross-claim against Velsicol. See id. Velsicol
then moved to have the firm representing Harwick (the firm of Wildman, Harrold,
Allen & Dixon) disqualified, because the firm previously represented an employee
and agent of Velsicol in a criminal matter. See id. at 128. Velsicol claimed that it
had standing to object to the Wildman firm representing Harwick because Velsicol
paid the employee's legal bill in the criminal suit. See id.
Ultimately, the district court denied the motion after reconstructing the scope
of the representation and found that Velsicol could not have reasonably believed
that the Wildman firm represented the company's interests in the criminal matter.
See id. Such a conclusion was supported by the testimony of Harwick's attorney.
See id. at 134. He stated that "Wildman did not have actual knowledge of...
relevant confidences and secrets." Id
125. See id. In addition, the Wildman firm's representation of Velsicol's em-
ployee and of Harwick are not substantially related. GTE North, Inc.'s Reply in
Support of its Motion to Disqualify Attorney Jon S. Faletto and the Law Firm of
Howard & Howard Attorneys, P.C. at 4, GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914
F. Supp. 1575 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (No. 95-C-50197). GTE North further pointed out
that Intemational Paper was distinguishable in so far as there were no written agree-
ments between co-defendants and Wildman did not switch sides in the same ac-
tion. See id.
126. For a discussion of the means by which the presumption of a confiden-
tial information disclosure may be rebutted, see supra note 76 and accompanying
text.
127. 578 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Conn. 1984).
128. See id. at 1285. Trinityjoined Aetna Ambulance and Professional Ambu-
lance in suing the city of Hartford for violations of antitrust laws. See id. at 1281.
Disqualification was premised on the contention that the attorney for Professional
Ambulance had access to confidential information during the initial stages of the
lawsuit and up until the time that Professional Ambulance switched sides in the
24
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of confidentiality test" and determined that it is not reasonable to
assume that confidential information given to a co-party's attorney
would be withheld from the co-party.129 However, it is reasonable to
assume that revealed information would not be given to an adverse
party for use against the revealing party.15 0 As in Trinity, GTE
North revealed information to Mr. Faletto with the reasonable be-
lief that the information would remain confidential.' 3 1 Just as Trin-
ity was found to have a reasonable belief that the disclosed
information would remain confidential, GTE North's belief that the
information would remain confidential was reasonable. 32
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by relying
on the undisputed facts of the parties' briefs to conclude that confi-
dential information was actually shared.'33 This decision is policy-
based.1 4 It furthers the intent of the parties that entered into the
Appleton and Investigation Agreements by enforcing the confiden-
tiality provisions of both agreements.' 3 5 If the court had not
granted the disqualification motion, the confidentiality provisions
antitrust suit. See id. Prior to realignment, Professional Ambulance and the other
plaintiffs "jointly retained an expert witness to assist in the prosecution of their
antitrust claims." Id. Consequently, Professional Ambulance possessed the results
of that report after the realignment and was familiar with the weaknesses of the
plaintiffs' case. See id. In addressing the "substantial relationship test," the district
court stated that the matters are "not only substantially related, they are the same."
I& at 1284.
129. See id. at 1285.
130. See id.
131. See GTE North Inc.'s Reply in Support of its Motion to Disqualify Attor-
ney Jon S. Faletto and the Law Firm of Howard & Howard, Attorneys, P.C. at 7,
GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575 (NJD. 111. 1996) (No. 95-
C-50197). In fact, GTE North "shared documents and legal analysis and shared
the costs of the investigation in anticipation of being co-plaintiffs in a cost recovery
action against additional potentially responsible parties." Id.
132. See Trinity, 578 F. Supp. at 1285 (determining what constitutes reason-
able belief regarding confidentiality).
133. See GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1579-81. The court stated that the attor-
ney for Dean Foods did not challenge GTE's assertions "that the matters [were]
the same or substantially related." Id. at 1579. Rather, the district court further
determined that an implied attorney-client relationship existed. See id. at 1581.
Where there is a subsequent adverse representation, it is presumed that: (1) pro-
tected information was obtained, and (2) that that information was shared. See
Denenberg & Learned, supra note 50, at 514. These presumptions are normally
rebuttable unless an entire firm has "switched sides." Cromley v. Board of Educ. of
Lockport, 17 F.3d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing exception to imputed
disqualification when attorney switches sides but not when entire firm switches
sides).
134. For a discussion of the policy reasons for disqualification, see supra notes
112-13 and accompanying text.
135. GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581. The district court stated that "[t]he
confidentiality provisions contained in both the Appleton Agreement and the In-
vestigation Agreement clearly establish an intent that the shared information
25
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of the agreements would have been rendered meaningless.136
Without confidentiality provisions, PRPs could withhold informa-
tion, thus decreasing the likelihood of settlement.13 7
VI. IMPACT
By granting the motion to disqualify both the attorney and the
firm representing Dean Foods, the district court rendered an opin-
ion that is consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct for the
Northern District of Illinois.'m Consequently, the district court's
position will further the policies of EPA to encourage settlement in
Superfund actions.' 3 9
Additonally, the court's holding in GTE North furthers the pur-
poses of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The two goals behind
the Rules of Professional Conduct are simple. 14° The first goal
seeks to encourage full disclosure' 4 ' while the second seeks to
maintain loyalty between a client and their respective counsel. 142
The district court's opinion furthers these two goals, in the context
of the facts presented, while being careful not to extend an implied
attorney-client relationship past those exceptions noted by the Sev-
enth Circuit in Westinghouse.'43 Since the decision of GTE North, the
district court has determined that their opinion in GTE North is con-
would remain confidential and would remain protected under the attorney-client
privilege." Id.
136. See Littell, supra note 30, at 252 (stating confidentiality problems associ-
ated with PRPs may be avoided if parties with same or similar interests agree prior
to representation as to manner in which counsel will use confidential
information).
137. See generally Ilona Dotterrer, Note, Attorney-Client Confidentiality: The Ethics
of Toxic Dumping Disclosure, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1157, 1173-74 (1989) (recognizing
clients reveal more facts and information when assured attorney will keep informa-
tion confidential).
138. For a discussion of the court's analysis and application of the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct, see supra notes 83-108 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of EPA's policies which are intended to encourage set-
tlement between the federal government and PRPs, see supra notes 39-45 and ac-
companying text.
140. Cf Hughes v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc. 565 F. Supp. 663, 666
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (stating Canons of Ethics seek to achieve two goals of ensuring
fundamental fairness and preventing unfair advantages).
141. See id. The Hughes court stated that "by ensuring confidentiality, the Ca-
nons foster an atmosphere of trust and encourage clients to fully disclose informa-
tion to the their attorneys." Id.
142. See id. The Hughes court stated that "the conflict of interest provisions
preserve... integrity." Id.
143. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Westinghouse, see supra notes
53-54 and 94-97 and accompanying text.
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sistent with the Seventh Circuit's three-prong "substantial relation-
ship test."144
The Rules of Professional Conduct should be applied to en-
force confidentiality provisions of agreements between PRPs. 145
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois's opinion is
consistent with the language of the private agreement which re-
flected the explicit intent of the members of the committee.' 46 Fi-
nally, the district court's application of the Rules of Professional
Conduct is consistent with precedent established in the Northern
District of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit and other jurisdictions. 147
Christopher M. Jaarda
144. See Continental Holdings, Inc. v. United States Can Co., No. 95-C5743,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9416, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 1996) (stating GTE North court
used proper application of three-part test to determine existence of substantial
relationship).
145. See Denenberg & Learned, supra note 50, at 511-12 (recognizing courts
as well as bar associations have ability to police attorney misconduct). Despite the
inherent power of bar associations to police misconduct, however, some courts
view it as "their duty to guarantee that attorneys adhere to the ethical guidelines
promulgated by the federal, state and local bar." Id. at 512. Accordingly, courts
adopting such a view will "resolve any doubts as to the existence of a conflict in
favor of disqualification." Id.
146. For a discussion of the languge of the agreement which sought to bind
the attorneys to confidentiality, see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of the legal context in which the Rules of Professional
Conduct have been applied in the Northern District of Illinois, see supra notes 46-
82 and accompanying text.
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